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FORFEITURE: GENERAL STATE OF THE LAW AND
MOVEMENT TO FURTHER CONFINE ITS APPLICATION
IN THE COAL LEASE
Recent case law developments in Ohio1 and West Virginia2 have narrowed
the application of forfeiture in obtaining the termination of a coal mining
lease for breach of express and implied covenants. This Note examines the
law of forfeiture generally, and later discusses these recent cases and their
ramifications.
I. DISTINGUISHING FORFEITURE FROM ABANDONMENT
A mining lease often contains an express covenant or condition requiring
the lessee to mine within a reasonable time with reasonable diligence. If this
type of covenant is not expressly provided in the lease, a court will often im-
ply a covenant to mine within a reasonable time and with due diligence.' If
the lessee fails or neglects to operate the mine or carry on mining activity
within a reasonable time, courts have held this breach to be a ground for for-
feiture.4 Similarly, courts have also held that the failure of a lessee to begin
mining within a reasonable time constitutes evidence of the lessee's intent to
abandon his right in the lease, therefore terminating the lease and deeming it
abandoned.5 The important distinction between termination of a lease by for-
feiture and termination by abandonment turns on the question of intention.
"[T]he act of the lessee may indicate his intention to abandon the enterprise
Ionno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 2 Ohio St. 3d 131, 443 N.E.2d 504 (1983).
2 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1982).
Island Coal Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53 N.E. 452 (1899) (in leases of mineral lands where
the lessee agrees to pay the lessor a royalty or rent, the lessee, in the absence of any provision to
the contrary, impliedly obligates himself to begin development and mining of the coal within a
reasonable time after execution of the lease); Owens v. Waggoner, 115 Ind. App. 43, 55 N.E.2d 335
(1944) (a lessee of mineral property who has agreed to pay a royalty or rent impliedly obligates
himself to begin development within a reasonable time in the absence of any contrary provision
within the lease); Maxwell v. Todd, 112 N.C. 677, 16 S.E. 926 (1893) (recognizing a duty imposed
upon the lessees to develop, test, and operate for minerals in a reasonable time and with due
diligence); Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383, 15 S.W. 396 (1891) (recognizing an implied agreement to
operate the mine if coal, which could be profitably worked, was found); Starn v. Huffman, 62 W.
Va. 422, 59 S.E. 179 (1907) (lease cancelled; based in equity upon implied covenant to begin work
within a reasonable time); 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 887AA, at 490
(3d ed. 1961).
Davis v. Riddle, 25 Colo. App. 162, 136 P. 551 (1913); Island Coal Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379,
53 N.E. 452 (1899) (a failure of the lessee, for an unreasonable length of time, to open and work the
mines of the leased premises, operates as a forfeiture of the lessee's rights); Owens v. Waggoner,
115 Ind. App. 43, 55 N.E.2d 335 (1944) (lessee's failure to begin mining within a reasonable time
after execution of the lease warranted forfeiture); Maxwell v. Todd, 112 N.C. 677, 16 S.E. 926
(1893) (lease held forfeited by lessee's failure to mine for an unreasonable amount of time);
Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383, 15 S.W. 396 (1891); Shenandoah Land & Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Hise, 92 Va. 238, 23 S.E. 303 (1895).
1 Mauney v. Millar, 134 Ark. 15, 203 S.W. 10 (1918); Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co.,
134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916); Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S.E. 825 (1914).
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he has undertaken ... when it would not be sufficient to show such neglect or
failure to develop ... as to entitle the lessor to a forfeiture of the lease."'
The distinction between forfeiture and abandonment is obscured by the
courts' use of a single basis for invoking both doctrines. The basis used in
both instances is the lessee's breach of the covenant to develop and operate
the mine within a reasonable time.7 Additionally, the holdings of some cases8
do not distinctly clarify which doctrine is being used to terminate the mining
lease, thus adding to the confusion.
A court may characterize the lessee's breach of the covenant to diligently
mine as an abandonment which consequently causes a forfeiture of the lease.'
In so using "forfeiture by abandonment," the court creates a misnomer since
there is a fundamental difference between forfeiture and abandonment. For-
feiture involves an involuntary divestment of rights based upon an inquiry as
to whether the lease has been complied with"0 whereas abandonment occurs
only where the intent to relinquish one's rights is present. "[T]he observation
is submitted that occasionally where courts speak of forfeiture for abandon-
ment, they intend in reality to [speak] of forfeiture for failure to develop.""
Nevertheless, "there is a distinction between failure or neglect of the lessee
to develop the leased premises or to operate the mine ... and the abandon-
ment by him of the enterprise, although in many cases this distinction is
obscure."12
II. FORFEITURE OF A MINING LEASE GENERALLY
Forfeitures are normally considered to be harsh remedies and are not
favored by courts." Often termed a penalty," a forfeiture will involuntarily
Annot., 60 A.L.R. 901, 926 (1929).
Iafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1978) (the doctrine of aban-
donment applicable to mineral leases is based upon an implied covenant to exploit minerals within
a reasonable time); Starn v. Huffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 59 S.E. 179 (1907).
, See Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 234 S.W. 498 (1921); Negaunee Iron Co. v. Iron Cliffs
Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1903), appeal dismissed, 197 U.S. 463 (1905). But ef. Beer v. Grif-
fith, 61 Ohio St. 2d 119, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980) (concerning an oil and gas lease, the court
specifically stated that an abandonment of the lease requires the intent to abandon).
' See supra note 8; see Maxwell v. Todd, 112 N.C. 677, 16 S.E. 926 (1893) (court held a
forfeiture, and also held the mining rights of the lessees were lost by "nonuse and abandonment").
10 McColl v. Bear Creek Coal Mining Co., 162 Iowa 491, 143 N.W. 532 (1913). See generally 54
Am. JUR. 2d Mines and Minerals § 141 (1971).
" Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1076, 1077 (1963).
12 R. DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL, AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA § 116, at 143
(1951).
13 Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W. Va. 505, 48 S.E.2d 350 (1948) ("it is an elementary rule that a
forfeiture is never favored and an equity court will lend its aid only to prevent or relieve from a
forfeiture"); Peerless Carbon Black Co. v. Gillespie, 87 W. Va. 441, 105 S.E. 517 (1920); A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 748 (1952); 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
887AA, at 490 (3d ed. 1961); R. SCHOSHINKSI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6:1 (1980).
See generally 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 102 (1968).
" "Although the words 'forfeiture' and 'penalty' are often used as synonyms, the word
1040 [Vol. 86
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divest one of his or her right or interest in property due to some breach of
duty or failure to comply with the law. Despite the general legal disfavor for
forfeiture, a mining lease can be forfeited. 15 Courts enforce forfeiture with
great reluctance, however, and in a case of hardship will often grant relief
from the harshness of the doctrine through equity." For example, a court
may refuse to enforce a forfeiture where the result would be unduly oppres-
sive."
If a mining lease contains no forfeiture clause, the court generally will
not recognize a forfeiture for the breach of a covenant contained in the
lease. 8 This has been the long established common law rule. 9 It has been held
in some cases, however, that the breach of an implied covenant to mine dili-
gently can result in forfeiture despite the lack of a forfeiture clause." Never-
'forfeiture' carries an implication of deprivation of something previously owned as distinguished
from subjection to a liability, but the distinction is often blurred." 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 769, at 640 (3d ed. 1961). See, e.g., Associated Cotton Shops, Inc. v.
Evergreen Park Shopping Plaza, 27 Ill. App. 2d 467, 170 N.E.2d 35 (1960) (forfeiture is in the
nature of a penalty for doing or failing to do a particular thing); see also Howard Cole & Co. v.
Williams, 157 Fla. 851, 27 So. 2d 352 (1946) (forfeiture contemplates a loss of property or a right, as
a penalty for violating the law or breach of contract). See generally 17 WORDS AND PHRASES
Forfeit; Forfeiture (1958).
15 See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 721, 739-41 (1961).
16 See Meers v. Tommy's Men's Store, Inc., 230 Ark. 49, 320 S.W.2d 770 (1959) (lessor was
equitably estopped from seeking forfeiture where by words and conduct he caused lessee to
believe that he would not enforce a forfeiture provided for in the lease); Ledford v. Atkins, 413
S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1967) (failure of condition was excused by the lack of willfulness of the breach and
the harsh forfeiture which would otherwise result); Wadman v. Boudreau, 270 Mass. 198, 170 N.E.
44 (1930) (equity used by court to relieve against forfeiture where the breach of contract did not
go to the essence of the agreement); Westerman v. Dinsmore, 68 W. Va. 594, 71 S.E. 250 (1911)
(equity will relieve from forfeiture if fraud, accident, mistake or inequitable conduct by the lessor
is present); see also 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 793, at 781 (3d ed.
1961).
" Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1982); Beech Fork Coal
Co., v. Pocahontas Corp., 109 W. Va. 39, 152 S.E. 785 (1930); Peerless Carbon Black Co. v.
Gillespie, 87 W. Va. 441, 105 S.E. 517 (1920); Pheasant v. Hanna, 63 W. Va. 613, 60 S.E. 618 (1908);
South Penn Oil Co. v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 348, 37 S.E. 596 (1900); see also 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW AND
REGULATION § 81.06[5], at 81-52 (1983); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 321 (1953).
S See Salley v. Michael, 151 Ark. 172, 235 S.W. 785 (1921); Duff v. Duff, 205 Ky. 10, 265 S.W.
305 (1924); Continental Fuel Co. v. Haden, 182 Ky. 8, 206 S.W. 8 (1918); Smith v. People's Natural
Gas Co., 257 Pa. 396, 101 A. 739 (1917); Home Creek Smokeless Coal Co. v. Combs, 204 Va. 561, 132
S.E.2d 399 (1963); Keller v. Model Coal Co., 142 W. Va. 597, 97 S.E.2d 337 (1957); Hamrick v. Nut-
ter, 93 W. Va. 115, 116 S.E. 75 (1923); Vaughan v. Napier, 92 W. Va. 217, 114 S.E. 526 (1922); see
also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 16.78, at 396-98 (1982); 4 D. VISH, COAL LA:w AND REGULATION §
81.06[3], at 81-51 (1983); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 721, 741-42 (1961).
11 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW & REGULATION § 81.06[3], at 81-50 (1983).
21 See Russell v. Johns Manville Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 405, 97 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1971) reh'g
denied, 20 Cal. App. 3d 413, 98 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1971); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Clayton Coal Co.,
110 Colo. 334, 134 P.2d 1062 (1943) (dictum); Dulin v. West, 528 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1974); Wecht
v. Anderson, 84 Nev. 500, 444 P.2d 501 (1968); Maxwell v. Todd, 112 N.C. 677, 16 S.E. 926 (1893)
(lease held forfeited for failure to mine for an unreasonable amount of time); Clintwood Coal Corp.
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theless, the prevailing view allows the lessor to recover only damages for
breach of an express or implied condition or covenant when the lease con-
tains no forfeiture provision."
An implied covenant to develop can be negated by specific language to
the contrary contained within a lease," as was held by the Supreme Court of
Texas in the 1981 case of Dallas Power & Light Co.v. J. V. Cleghorn." In Dal-
las, the lessor, J. V. Cleghorn, sought a declaratory judgment to cancel
eleven no-term coal and lignite leases; in the alternative he sought a decree
requiring the lessees to explore and develop the leased land . 4 Both remedies
sought by Cleghorn were based upon the theory that there was an implied
covenant to develop the land in spite of language within the leases to the con-
trary.
The lease agreements granted the lessees the right to mine coal and
lignite, specified no term in which the lessees were to develop the land, and
allowed the lessees to maintain the leases so long as an annual delay rental of
fifty cents per acre was paid." Furthermore the lease provided:
It is understood between the parties hereto that this lease shall not be for-
feited for any failure to prosecute mining operations on the land ... nor shall
any forfeiture be claimed or enforced for the breach of any implied covenant,
but the title to the minerals on said land ... shall not revert to... [lessor] or
his assigns so long as the annual rentals ... are being paid.'
The court sustained the lessees' view that "there can be no implied cov-
enant arising out of an instrument which contains express terms negating
such a covenant," and that "the leases make clear the express intention of the
parties to disclaim any covenant of development by the lessees."'7 To support
its decision in favor of the lessees, the court reasserted a prior holding 28 that
courts cannot imply terms contrary to express language written by the par-
ties to a contract, and further that both the language used and the parties'
mutual intent were clear under the contract.
9
v. Turner, 133 Va. 464, 114 S.E. 117 (1922); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 721, 739-41 (1961).
In determining whether the lessee has breached the covenant to mine diligently in an oil
lease, some courts have used the "prudent operator rule," which doesn't require development of
the mineral rights unless a prudent operator would so develop the property. 6 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 887AA, at 492-98 (3d ed. 1961).
2" See supra note 18; see also R. DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL. AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA
AND VIRGINIA § 111 at 137 (1951).
' Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632 (1941); Freeport
Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d 1039 (1928).
23 623 S.W.2d 310 (Texas 1981).
21 Id at 310.
' Id. at 311.
2 Id. (brackets in original).
27 Id
W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
623 S.W.2d at 311.
[Vol. 861042
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Some courts will characterize a breach of an implied covenant to mine
within a reasonable time as a forfeiture by abandonment." In these cases, the
court will generally recognize a forfeiture only if the lessee abandons the
leased premises.3' If the level of the lessee's breach does not reach abandon-
ment, but is instead a breach of a condition or covenant and there is no ex-
press lease provision for forfeiture, the court generally will not terminate the
tenancy.32 The remedy usually will be damages or, where appropriate, injunc-
tive relief, but not forfeiture."
If a mining lease contains an express forfeiture clause, a majority of
jurisdictions hold that a tenancy can be terminated upon the lessee's breach
of a covenant or condition,34 provided there is no waiver or estoppel by the
lessor which would prevent enforcement of the forfeiture provision.3 5 Several
' See Deerfield Rock Corp. v. McClellan, 121 So. 2d 822 (Fla. App. 1960); George v. Jones,
168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959); Iafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128 (W.
Va. 1978) (the doctrine of abandonment applicable to mineral leases is based upon an implied cove-
nant to exploit minerals within a reasonable time); Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S.E. 825
(1914); Starn v. Huffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 59 S.E. 179 (1907) (lease cancelled for failure to mine,
based in equity upon implied covenant to begin work within a reasonable time).
31 See Keller v. Model Coal Co., 142 W. Va. 597, 97 S.E.2d 337 (1957) (in absence of forfeiture
provision in mineral lease, forfeiture will not be declared unless facts show an abandonment of en-
terprise by lessee).
I Olson v. Pederson, 194 Neb. 159, 231 N.W.2d 310 (1975) (in absence of statute to contrary,
tenancy cannot be terminated for breach of covenant, condition or collateral agreement unless
there is an express provision in lease for forfeiture or right of reentry); Layne v. Baker, 86 Ohio
App. 293, 91 N.E.2d 539 (1949) (in a landlord-tenant eviction case, the court recognized that breach
of a covenant in a lease does not work a forfeiture unless there is an express stipulation of such
forfeiture); see also Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952) (breaches of lease
normally furnish basis for claim of damage, not forfeiture, unless lease provides for automatic can-
cellation for breaches).
" Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952) (breaches of lease normally fur-
nish basis for claim of damages, not forfeiture); Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122
(1969) (covenants in a lease, as a general rule are independent, unless made dependent, and their
breach gives rise only to a suit for damages).
I See Pierce Dev. Co. v. Martin, 218 Ala. 27, 117 So. 312 (1928) (contract giving lessor right
to terminate the lease in case of default in performance of covenant or agreement was upheld);
Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1969); Cherokee Constr. Co. v. Bishop, 86 Ark. 489,
112 S.W. 189 (1908); Russell v. Johns Manville Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 405, 97 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1971);
Shrewsbury v. Reynolds-Morse Corp., 105 Colo. 30, 94 P.2d 686 (1939) (lease subject to forfeiture
where lease gave lessor option to declare forfeiture if lessee insolvent and payroll or other indebt-
edness was unpaid); Cypress Creek Coal Co. v. Boonville Mining Co., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N.E. 645
(1924) (failure of lessee to pay royalties would make forfeiture optional to the lessor); Island Coal
Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53 N.E. 452 (1899) (forfeiture awarded where lessee breached express
forfeiture covenant to develop the coal interest within a specific time); Owens v. Waggoner, 115
Ind. App. 43, 55 N.E.2d 335 (1944) (forfeiture for breach of covenant to develop); Wadman v. Bou-
dreau, 270 Mass. 198, 170 N.E. 44 (1930) (any breach of a contract which provides that the contract
can be revoked and- declared null and void on breach of any provision contained therein, would at
law give right to end contract); Walnut Run Coal Co. v. Knight, 201 Pa. 23, 50 A. 288 (1901).
Big Sandy Co. v. Robinson, 19 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1927) (lessor acquiescing in and encourging
receivership of lessee held estopped to claim forfeiture); see Lester v. National Shawmut Bank of
1984] 1043
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breached covenants which commonly result in forfeiture are covenants to pay
royalties," to commence mining within a specified time37 or within a reason-
able time' or covenants to mine diligently."3
Due to its penal nature, potential for harshness and general disfavor by
the courts, an express forfeiture provision is strictly construed against the
party invoking the forfeiture (generally the lessor).0 The West Virginia case
of Iafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp., illustrates that court's strict en-
forcement of the requirements contained within an express forfeiture clause.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in this 1978 case reversed a
trial court's holding that declared forfeiture for a breach of an express provi-
sion of a mining lease.'2 The reversal was based upon the lessor's failure to
provide thirty days' notice to the lessee before declaring forfeiture. 3 The les-
sors had given notice to the lessees that they were terminating the lease, but
they made no mention of any corrective measures which the lessee could take
to alleviate the breach. The lease provision, which provided for the thirty-day
Boston, 238 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1956) (person failing to pay rentals due under coal lease and failing
to diligently mine as required by the lease forfeited his rights under the lease); Alabama Ver-
miculite Corp. v. Patterson, 124 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.S.C. 1954) (lessor's attempted reservations of
rights after knowledge of alleged breach constituted waiver of breach); Dixson v. C. & G. Ex-
cavating, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1978) (no forfeiture due to lessor's threats of physical violence
which caused the alleged breach of covenant to reclaim); Island Coal Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53
N.E. 452 (1899) (mere silence of the lessor is not to be construed as waiver of a breached condition
of forfeiture); Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S.E. 762 (1909) (forfeiture deemed waived by
lessor's conduct).
See Cypress Creek Co. v. Boonville Mining Co., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N.E. 645 (1924) (if the les-
see fails to pay royalties as agreed, then it is optional with the lessor to treat the lease as for-
feited); Walnut Run Coal Co. v. Knight, 201 Pa. 23, 50 A. 288 (1901).
" Island Coal Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53 N.E. 452 (1899) (lessee breached covenant under
penalty of forfeiture to commence development of the lessor's coal interest within a specified
time). Cf. Cypress Creek Coal Co. v. Boonville Mining Co., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N.E. 645 (1924) (court
construed provision in lease requiring lessee to "begin" operation within six months in favor of
the lessee).
I Owens v. Waggoner, 115 Ind. App. 43, 55 N.E.2d 335 (1944) (holding forfeiture for breach of
covenant to develop within a reasonable time).
11 Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1969); Cherokee Constr. Co. v. Bishop, 86
Ark. 489, 112 S.W. 189 (1908); Russell v. Johns Manville Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 405, 97 Cal. Rptr. 634
(1971).
"0 Gould v. Hyatt, 154 N.E. 173 (Ohio App. 1926) ("the conditions as well as the law under
which a forfeiture is sought should be strictly construed"); Iafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal
Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1978); Marmet v. Watson, 106 W. Va. 429, 145 S.E. 744 (1928); Bickel
v. Sheppard, 98 W. Va. 305, 127 S.E. 41 (1925) (forfeiture provisions in contracts are to be strictly
construed); R. SclOSHINSai, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6:1-6:2, at 378, 381, 385
(1980); 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW AND REGULATION § 81.06[5], at 81-52 (1983); see also Texas & N.O.R.
Co. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952) (court, in a landlord-tenant case, stated that the terms
of a forfeiture provision must be strictly and precisely complied with).
250 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1978).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 20
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss3/20
FORFEITURE
notice, was strictly enforced despite evidence that the lessees had failed to
keep certain equipment in repair.4 The court also noted that the forfeiture is-
sue was an extraneous matter in the case.
4 5
Any ambiguities contained within a forfeiture clause are also construed
against the lessor since the forfeiture clause is generally added to the lease
instrument for his or her benefit.46 In addition, it is commonly held that, to
obtain a forfeiture, the lessee's breach must be clear and unequivocal. 7 For
example, circumstances beyond the control of the lessee have been held
grounds to preclude forfeiture for breach of an express condition or
covenant. 8 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in the 1981 case of Williams
v. Vesley," upheld a lower court's finding of no forfeiture where the lessee
"made every reasonable and possible effort to commence actual mining oper-
ations,"'" but was delayed beyond the specified one-year period in the lease
through no fault of his own. The evidence established that the Department of
Environmental Resources was unduly slow in processing the lessee's applica-
tion to obtain permits to begin mining operations.5
III. CONSTRAINING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE
A. Bethlehem Steel v. Shonk Land Company
A recent West Virginia decision 2 has espoused a minority position which
decreases the perimeters in which forfeiture may be utilized to obtain the
termination of a coal mining lease and in which an express forfeiture pro-
vision may be enforced. This holding will undoubtedly prompt the restructur-
ing of forfeiture provisions in future coal mining leases, as well as restrict
their future usefulness.
In 1982, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stringently limited
the usefulness of forfeiture as a means of cancelling a coal lease in Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co.'3 The appellant, Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
4I Id.
45 Id.
" Sewell v. Aggregate Supply Co., 214 Ga. 543, 106 S.E.2d 16 (1958); Marmet v. Watson, 106
W. Va. 429, 145 S.E. 744 (1928); Hamrick v. Nutter, 93 W. Va. 115, 116 S.E. 75 (1923); 4 D. VISH,
COAL LAW & REGULATION § 81.06[3], at 81-51 (1983).
" See Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17
A.2d 130 (1941) (to hold that a lease is forfeited, the covenant therein must clearly have been vio-
lated); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922); 6 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 887AA, at 490 (3d ed. 1961).




52 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. Only the relevant portions of the opinion regarding forfeiture and those parts needed
for a clear understanding of the case are included within this Note.
1984] 1045
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brought the case to the supreme court after the trial court directed a verdict
against it and declared a forfeiture of all improvements, equipment and per-
sonal property.' Bethlehem Steel had leased the coal mining property, the
processing plant and the appurtenances upon the land originally through a
series of sub-leases dating from 1914.11
The 1968 expiration date of the original lease was extended to 1978 by an
amendment of lease between Bethlehem Steel and the property owner,
Shonk Land Company, Ltd." The amendment of lease also contained a re-
newal provision allowing the lessee to give the lessor written notice to renew
or extend the lease, provided the lessee performed its covenants under the
lease. 7
Near the end of the expiration period, Bethlehem Steel sent a renewal
notice to Shonk which attempted to extend its lease until 1987. Shonk re-
sponded that Bethlehem Steel had breached several conditions and covenants
contained within the lease, and that if these were not corrected within a spec-
ified period of time, Shonk would "declare a forfeiture, re-enter, take posses-
sion of all improvements and pursue all its legal and equitable remedies."58
Furthermore, Shonk refused to renew the lease for an additional ten-year
period due to the breaches by Bethlehem Steel. 9
Bethlehem Steel then sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit
court after attempting to cure its defaults." Shonk counterclaimed for dam-
ages and a declaration of forfeiture. The trial court awarded Shonk
$10,344,219.82 in damages and declared a complete forfeiture of equipment,
personal property, and more than six and one-half million dollars in improve-
ments which had been made by Bethlehem Steel to modify the processing
plant in 1971 and 1975.81
Reversing the trial court's declaration of wholesale forfeiture, the court
held that Shonk, the lessor, could be "made whole by monetary damages" and
by non-renewal; therefore, forfeiture was not justified.2 The monetary test
espoused by the court to determine whether relief could or could not be had
in equity was "to consider whether compensation can or cannot be made." 3
To reconcile its holding with the forfeiture clause provided in the amend-
ment of lease, the court characterized the forfeiture clause as a "catch-all"
" Id. at 141.
5 Id.
SId.






Id. (quoting Klein v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 88, 90 (1881)).
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clause which was neither specific nor definite enough to be a valid forfeiture
clause." The forfeiture clause contained in the amendment of lease provided:
If... default shall be made by Lessee in the performance of any other coven-
ant or condition herein contained to be performed by it and any such default
shall continue for a period of sixty (60) days after written demand by Lessor
for the performance thereof.. . then Lessor, at its option, may ... declare a
forfeiture of all the right, title and interest of Lessee to all the property for-
ming the subject matter of this lease.'
The nonspecific references made to breached covenants within the forfeiture
provision were held insufficient to constitute a valid forfeiture clause." The
court re-emphasized its language in Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal
Co.," stating that when a covenant is relied upon for raising forfeiture, the
language must be "clearly and definitively expressed in the forfeiture
clause."68 Subsequent to the Shonk and Easley decisions, it would appear that
in order to obtain any judicial enforcement of a forfeiture provision based
upon breaches of covenants or conditions in a coal mining lease, it is neces-
sary that the lease state explicitly within the forfeiture clause the breached
covenants meriting forfeiture. This provision would be in addition to the
usual stating of conditions and covenants in another provision of the instru-
ment. In other words, the forfeiture clause cannot incorporate covenants and
conditions from the instrument as a whole, but must specifically state the
covenants and conditions within itself.
Even with an expressed statement of covenants and conditions within a
forfeiture clause, the court's liberal use of equity to avoid forfeiture is
strongly foreshadowed in the Shonk case. In the case of forfeiture for nonper-
formance of pecuniary covenants, the court in Shonk reaffirmed its prior hol-
ding that "equity goes as a matter of course, where compensation may be
made."69 The court's use of monetary damages and compensation would effec-
tively avoid forfeiture in many cases despite an express forfeiture provision
meeting the strict standards set forth in Shonk and Easley Coal,' if it is uti-
lized by the court in cases where the forfeiture clause is deemed to be valid.
In addition, the court in Shonk emphasized the principle that before a
lessor may obtain forfeiture, action must be taken upon the underlying




c, 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922).
288 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. (quoting Wheeling & E.G. Ry. Co. v. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 516, 52 S.E. 499, 511
(1905)).
70 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922).
" 288 S.E.2d at 143.
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ing it. Failure to enforce the lease early in its term may make subsequent
forfeiture an unconscionable result.2 The lessor may not "[lull] the lessee into
a feeling of security and [throw] him off guard."73 Additionally, the court held
that the lessor may be estopped from prevailing in his forfeiture claim if he
takes no steps to enforce the lease until after the lessee has detrimentally
changed his position.' Shonk's failure to enforce the covenants under the
lease during the tenancy was viewed by the court as acquiescing to
Bethlehem Steel's actions. Therefore, Shonk was estopped from asserting the
forfeiture claim after Bethlehem Steel had relied upon Shonk's
acquiescence. 5 Finally, the court held that the lessor may waive the lessee's
default by failing to enforce the lease early in its term. Negligence by one
party in conjunction with injury to the other party resulting from that
negligence was asserted by the court as a ground for denial of relief."
The court's decision in Shonk gives more stability to the coal mining
leasehold. Protection for the lessee is heightened as the difficulty in obtain-
ing forfeiture rises for the lessor. As in the Shonk case, where Bethlehem
Steel had invested more than six and one-half million dollars in im-
provements to the leased property, the lessee's investment may be substan-
tial. Decreasing the likelihood of wholesale forfeiture, even when a forfeiture
provision has been included within the lease, will add an additional positive
factor for business consideration. Increased stability encourages coal in-
dustry investment and development, and, of course, the eventual rewards of
a healthy, growing business are reaped by many.
Even with the comfort given to lessees by the Shonk decision, the lessor
still retains recourse for breaches of lease covenants through monetary
damages. The remedy of monetary damages can be a persuasive tool to en-
courage conformity with the lease covenants and in many cases can ade-
quately compensate the lessor for most injuries. Of course, the Shonk deci-
sion did not eliminate the use of forfeiture when necessary to achieve justice,
but instead makes the remedy significantly more difficult to obtain.
B. lonno v. Glen-Gery Corporation
The Ohio Supreme Court, in January, 1983, also adopted a monetary test,
akin to that used in Shonk, to be applied before forfeiture of a mining lease
may be invoked. The court, in Ionno v. Glen-Gery Corp.," stepped beyond the
judicially determined monetary test in Shonk, however, and placed an affirm-
72 Id.
71 Id. (quoting Hukell v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S.E. 151 (1892)).
11 288 S.E.2d at 143-44.
' Id. at 144.
76 Id.
1 2 Ohio St. 3d 131, 443 N.E.2d 504 (1983).
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ative burden upon the lessor to prove that money damages would be inade-
quate before forfeiture will be awarded by the court.
In lonno, the lessors, John M. and Lucinda S. Ionno, sought forfeiture and
cancellation of a coal and clay mining lease because of the lessee's non-
performance of the lease and failure of consideration. 8 In so doing, three
issues were presented for determination by the court: first, whether a lessee
is under an obligation to reasonably develop the leased land; second, whether
a lessee is relieved of the obligation to reasonably develop if payment of an
annual royalty is made; and third, whether the breach of an implied covenant
to reasonably develop is a proper ground for forfeiture.
79
The lease between the Ionnos and Glen-Gery Corporation granted the
lessee right to "mine, let, and lease" coal and clay upon the lessors' property
in exchange for a royalty on the product mined or a "minimum rent or
royalty" to be paid to the lessors." The minimum royalty consisted of $300.00
each year for the first two years and $600.00 each year thereafter.' Pursuant
to the lease, any minimum royalty paid to the lessors would be credited
against future royalties upon mining of the product.2 The lease also con-
tained a forfeiture provision which provided:
Lessee agrees that in the event payment of the rent or royalty due ... is not
made ... or if the Lessee shall fail to keep and perform any of the covenants
on its part to be kept and performed, . . then this Lease shall, at the option of
the Lessors, become null and void and of no further force or effect.'
The lessee tendered all payments as required pursuant to the lease, but,
since 1960, the inception of the lease, had not undertaken any mining activity
or operations. 4 The trial court concluded that there was no implied duty to
perform the mining lease within a reasonable time and ruled in favor of the
lessee. 5 The appellate court, finding that there was an implied duty upon the
lessee, reversed and ordered forfeiture and cancellation of the lease.
The Ohio Supreme Court initially addressed the question of whether
there was an implied duty upon the lessee to develop the land. The court
noted that there was no provision within the lease which required the lessee
to begin mining operations within a specified period of time, but found this
Id. at 506.
"Id.
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of no consequence, since the court had long ago established and followed the
principle that there is an implied duty upon the lessee to develop.8 The court
concluded that, absent an express disclaimer within the lease, there is an im-
plied covenant in a mineral lease to develop the land within a reasonable
time."
The second issue addressed by the court was the lessee's contention that
its payment of an annual minimum royalty relieved it of the obligation to
diligently mine." To evaluate the validity of the lessee's argument, the court
examined the language in the lease. The lease provided that the annual pay-
ment made by the lessee would be "credited against the amount or amounts
that shall thereafter become due for or on account of the removal, mining, or
hauling of coal and/or clay."'" Viewing the minimum payments not as indepen-
dent and non-refundable consideration for rent but as offsets of the produc-
tion royalties, the court found the actual consideration for the lease to be the
expected return from the mining of the land. As such, the annual payments
made by the lessee for a period of more than eighteen years were held not to
abate the lessee's duty to develop the land within a reasonable time.92 Fur-
thermore, the court held that long-term leases which encumber a lessor's
property in perpetuity through annual payments, but under which there is no
development of the mineral property, are against public policy. The public
policy enforced by the court is based upon the importance of the mining of
mineral lands.
In approaching the final issue of forfeiture, the court recognized
forfeiture as an extreme measure which would not be found unless there is a
violation of a clear right. In addition, the court noted that forfeiture must be
necessary to achieve justice between the parties before it is invoked.93
Reasserting its past holding in Beer v. Griffith,94 which concerned an oil
and gas lease, the court emphasized that "the remedy for a breach of implied
covenant, without more, is damages, and not forfeiture of the lease."9 Ignor-
ing the forfeiture clause contained within the lease, the court held that relief
Id. (citing Beer v. Griffith, 61 Ohio St. 2d 119, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980); Venedocia Oil & Gas
Co. v. Robinson, 71 Ohio St. 302, 73 N.E. 222 (1905), and Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48
N.E. 502 (1897)).





9 61 Ohio St. 2d 119, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980).
" 443 N.E.2d at 508 (quoting Beer v. Griffith, 61 Ohio St. 2d 119, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980) (since
certain causes of forfeiture were specified in the oil lease, the remedy for breach of an implied cov-
enant is not forfeiture, but damages); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897)
(the breach of an implied covenant in an oil lease leads to an action for damages not forfeiture).
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will be granted to achieve justice even if specific grounds for forfeiture are
set forth in the lease." The only exception to this rule recognized by the
court occurs where legal remedies are inadequate. Furthermore, the court
held that "the lessor has the burden of proving that damages are inadequate
before such forfeiture may be declared."" Since the Ionnos made no claim nor
offered any proof that damages were inadequate and instead sought
forfeiture as their sole relief, the court reversed the holding of the appellate
court. 8 In summary, the court held that, despite a forfeiture clause within the
lease, forfeiture based upon an implied covenant to diligently mine will only
be enforced as a remedy if monetary damages are inadequate and proved as
such.
The court's holding in Ionno followed the general rule that a court will
imply a covenant to mine diligently if it is not expressly provided in the
lease.9 However, the ruling retreats from the view that leases may be
deemed forfeited or abandoned where an express forfeiture clause is pro-
vided and no mining activity has been done for a number of years.' 9 Although
the court did not abandon this view in toto, it has placed a sizeable obstacle
in the path of a lessor who seeks to obtain forfeiture: proof that monetary
damages are inadequate to compensate the injury is necessary.
C. The Monetary Test
Both Shonk and Ionno set forth a threshold monetary test' which must
be overcome before forfeiture will be enforced by the court. The tests
espoused by the courts1"' are similar in that neither will permit forfeiture if
monetary damages are adequate to restore and compensate the lessor."3 In
Shonk, however, it is not definitively expressed that the court will utilize the
" 443 N.E.2d at 508.
9' Id.
" Id. at 508-09.
See supra note 3.
1Co See Russell v. Johns Manville Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 405, 97 Cal. Rptr. 634, reh'g denied, 20
Cal. App. 3d 413, 98 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1971) (failure of lessee to develop mining property may be con-
sidered an abandonment and result in forfeiture); Deerfield Rock Corp. v. McClellan, 121 So. 2d
822 (Fla. 1960) (lease subject to cancellation due to unreasonable delay of four years before beginn-
ing to mine); Chapman v. Continental Oil Co., 149 Kan. 822, 89 P.2d 833 (1939) (lease considered
abandoned where lessee failed to start work for more than 40 years after the lease's execution).
"I In Shonk, the court held that forfeiture was not justified since the lessor could be made
whole by monetary damages and non-renewal of the lease. In addition, the court based the
availability of equitable relief upon the consideration of whether compensation could or could not
be made. 288 S.E.2d at 142. In lonno, the court placed a burden of proof upon the lessor to prove
that monetary damages would be inadequate before forfeiture would be considered as a remedy
by the court. 2 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
,1 Although neither court defined its application of monetary damages as a test per se, the
author takes that liberty for ease of reference.
," 288 S.E.2d at 142; 2 Ohio St. 3d at 134-35, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
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monetary test if a valid forfeiture clause is contained in the lease, although
the decision may implicate that conclusion. This is based upon the fact that,
subsequent to the court's holding that forfeiture was not justified because
the lessor could be made whole by monetary damages and non-renewal of the
lease, the court declared the lease forfeiture provision invalid.
The leases in both Shonk and lonno contained a forfeiture clause. Each
clause gave the lessor the ability and option to declare a forfeiture upon the
lessee's failure to perform the required covenants under the lease.' Both
forfeiture provisions imposed upon the lessor a specified period of written
notification to the lessee prior to declaration of forfeiture.' But neither
forfeiture clause expressly set forth the exact covenants which would result
in forfeiture if breached." 8
In Shonk, the court declared the forfeiture clause invalid because of the
provision's failure to expressly set forth the covenants which would give rise
to a forfeiture."7 The court's opinion, however, initially states only that
forfeiture is not justified because the lessor can be made whole by monetary
damages and non-renewal of the lease; only afterwards does the court discuss
the invalidity of the forfeiture clause."8 This may indicate that the determina-
tion of the validity or invalidity of the forfeiture clause is not a condition
precedent to the court's use of the monetary test. If so, the usefulness of the
forfeiture provision within the coal mining lease is severely restricted.
The restriction of the forfeiture provision is two-fold. First, to obtain
forfeiture, the court must determine that money damages are inadequate to
fully compensate the lessor. This alone is a formidable threshold, since
damages are likely to be adequate in many instances. Second, the court, as
detailed in Shonk, will closely scrutinize the forfeiture clause. If the clause
does not meet all standards espoused by the court, as established in Shonk
and Easley Coal Co.," 9 it will be declared invalid and unenforceable.
In contrast to the court's careful scrutiny of the forfeiture clause and
subsequent declaration of invalidity in Shonk, the court in Ionno set forth the
forfeiture provision, but did not discuss or scrutinize it. Instead, the court
specifically provided that "relief will be granted when necessary to do justice
to the parties, even though specific grounds for forfeiture are set forth in the
10 288 S.E.2d at 143; 2 Ohio St. 3d at 131, 443 N.E.2d at 506.
105 See supra note 104 (A 30-day time period was provided in the Ionno lease; a 60-day time
period was provided in the Shonk lease).
106 288 S.E.2d at 143; 2 Ohio St. 3d at 131, 443 N.E.2d at 506.
10 288 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 142-43.
' Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 297, 112 S.E. 512, 514 (1922) ("the
broken covenant or condition relied upon for forfeiture must be found not only in the instrument,
by clear and definite expression, but also within the forfeiture clause, by such expression").
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lease.""' Bypassing the forfeiture provision, the court was not willing to raise
forfeiture until the lessor proved that his injury could not be satisfied by.
monetary damages."'
The courts' use of a monetary damages or compensation test, in Shonk
and Ionno, to relieve a lessee from forfeiture of a coal mining lease is not a
new test within the general realm of forfeiture law and equity. The maxim,
"equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture where
compensation can be made,""' has long been recognized in contract law."3
Likewise, in general landlord-tenant law, some courts have long held that if
the lessor can, by compensation or otherwise, be placed in the same condition
as if the breach of a covenant had not occurred, then equity will relieve the
lessee from forfeiture of the lease.1 4 Although not the first cases"' to have
done so, the Shonk and Ionno decisions have applied these equitable prin-
ciples to the mining lease.
The significant aspect of the monetary test in both Shonk and lonno is
not that money damages will be awarded to avoid forfeiture generally, but
that the monetary damages test will be applied before forfeiture will be
allowed even where a forfeiture provision for breach of covenants is included
within the lease agreement.
The general rule followed in most jurisdictions allows damages as the
only remedy for breach of covenants when no forfeiture clause is included
within the mining lease."6 When an express forfeiture provision is included in
the lease, however, most courts will allow forfeiture so long as there has been
no waiver or estoppel by the lessor,"7 a clear breach of the covenant"' or a
result which would not be unduly oppressive."9 The Shonk and lonno deci-
,20 2 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
"' Id.
'I' Quoting Richard Francis, twelfth maxim.
3 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 775, at 656 (3d ed. 1961).
Meers v. Tommy's Men's Store, Inc., 230 Ark. 49, 320 S.W.2d 770 (1959) ("[e]quity relieves
against forfeiture ... when by accident or mistake there has been a breach of some collateral cov-
enant ... and where the lessor may be placed in the same position as if the breach had not occur-
red by an award of damages or otherwise"); Whitmore v. Meenach, 33 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 1940)
("[w]here the breach of a lease is compensable in money, a tender of payment of the amount due
will ordinarily be deemed sufficient reason to avoid the forfeiture"); Lundin v. Schoeffel, 167 Mass.
465, 45 N.E. 933 (1897); Mactier v. Osborn, 146 Mass. 399, 15 N.E. 641 (1888); Hasden v. McGinnis,
54 Tenn. App. 39, 43, 387 S.W.2d 631, 633 (1964) (sets forth the compensation test used in Shonk:
"[t]he true test ... by which to ascertain whether relief can or cannot be had in equity is to con-
sider whether compensation can be made or not"). See generally 49 Am. JuR. 2d Landlord and
Tenant §§ 1076, 1078 (1970).
"' Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1960) (equity relieved forfeiture where full compensa-
tion could be made in money and forfeiture would be a great hardship on the lessee).
11 See supra note 21.
1 See supra note 35.
18 See supra note 47.
1 See supra note 17.
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sions rank as minority holdings because, even with a lease provision pro-
viding for forfeiture upon the breach of a lease covenant, the courts in those
jurisdictions will first decide whether monetary damages are adequate; only
then will they apply the contract provision. Even then the contract provision
still must pass muster as a valid forfeiture provision which will be strictly
construed-the lessor must not be guilty of waiver or estoppel, the breach
must be clear and the result must not be unduly oppressive or uncon-
scionable.
The lessee gains security because of the heavy burden upon the lessor
who seeks to obtain forfeiture. Under the minority view, what began as a
general abhorrence of forfeiture has evolved into a view which makes forfei-
ture a near impossibility. The Shonk decision sets forth many avenues of for-
feiture avoidance, including monetary damages, waiver, estoppel, unconscion-
ability and invalidation of the forfeiture clause. A definitive clarification of
the opinion's implication that adequate money damages may restrict and de-
fine the activation of all forfeiture provisions will be an interesting develop-
ment to look for in future coal lease cases in West Virginia.
D. Restricting Freedom of Contract
Both the Shonk and lonno decisions may be viewed as restricting
freedom of contract if, regardless of an agreement between the parties to a
contract to include a forfeiture provision for breach of a condition or cove-
nant, the court chooses not to enforce the forfeiture provision if monetary
damages will suffice.2 In addition, as in Shonk, if the forfeiture provision is
not sufficiently explicit in its terms, the court may also refuse to enforce it."'
A court's failure to enforce a forfeiture provision on the basis that
monetary damages will be sufficient to compensate the injury is contrary to
the language that the parties themselves have bargained for and written into
the contract. Query whether a valid forfeiture clause, mutually agreed upon
and inserted in a lease by the parties after arm's-length bargaining, can, con-
sistent with the policies underlying contract law (including freedom of con-
tract), be set aside in favor of monetary damages?
By use of the monetary test, the court in effect drafts a revised lease
agreement between the parties. Through the court's use of equity, the lessee
is allowed to make a better bargain than he was able or chose to make at the
time of the execution of the lease. Consider the statement written by Sum-
mers in his treatise on oil and gas concerning oil and gas leases:
[I]f the parties have deliberately, and without fraud or mistake, entered into a
valid lease ... in terms of plain and unmistakeable meaning, a court does not
... See 288 S.E.2d at 142-44; 2 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
'" 288 S.E.2d at 142-43.
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have the power to -place a different interpretation upon the contract on
grounds of policy that it would be better.., generally to have the contract dif-
ferent.1"
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that courts of equity
do not ordinarily provide relief against harsh or unfair contracts."u Barring
contracts of adhesion and assuming contracts bargained for by the lessee and
lessor at arm's length, it seems the lessee should not be aided by the court in
obtaining relief from a bad bargain which includes a forfeiture provision.
Long before the Shonk and Ionno decisions, however, several punctures
were made by the needle of equity into the sphere of freedom to contract for
forfeiture. Courts have held that forfeiture may be avoided through equity
where the result would be unduly oppressive, 4 or where forfeiture is "so
grossly disproportionate to any actual damage" that "enforcement of the pro-
vision would shock the conscience," '125 or where the result of the forfeiture
would be unconscionable. 2 ' The use of equity to avoid forfeiture in these cir-
cumstances is consistent with the general view of forfeiture as a "harsh, coer-
cive and disfavored" remedy, the use of which should be limited."
In the Shonk decision, the court was undoubtedly influenced by the six
and one-half million dollars in improvements made by the lessee to the
leasehold property. Wholesale forfeiture of the lease would have provided
the lessor with a windfall of the valuable improvements, while penalizing the
lessee with the loss of more than six and one-half million dollars. At the trial
court level, the six and one-half million dollars would have been in addition to
the $10,344,219.82 in damages awarded to the lessors. 28
The unjustness of forfeiture in the Shonk case seems self-evident when
one compares the results of forfeiture with the breaches alleged to have been
committed by Bethlehem Steel. Although the breached covenants and condi-
tions were not insubstantial, the trial court's award, totaling almost seven-
teen million dollars in damages and property value, was a windfall for the
lessee. The breached covenants included "(1) failing to pay royalties on raw
' 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 373 (1959).
'2 Sun Printing & Publishing Assoc. v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902); 5 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 775, at 656 (3d ed. 1961).
Ml Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 400 (Fla. 1960) (equity afforded relief from forfeiture
where full compensation could be made in money and forfeiture would place a great hardship on
the lessee). See generally 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1076 (1970).
125 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 775, at 656 (3d Ed. 1961).
See Hasden v. McGinnis, 54 Tenn. App. 39, 387 S.W.2d 631 (1964) (stating the underlying
principle of a court of equity as a court of conscience permitting nothing within its jurisdiction
which is unconscionable); Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S.E. 151 (1892).
I" See generally 54 Am. JuPL 2d Mines and Minerals § 141 (1971); 17 WORDS AND PHRASES,
Forfeit; Forfeiture (1958 & Supp. 1983).
'" 288 S.E.2d at 141.
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coal as opposed to processed coal; (2) failing to pay any royalties on two
mines; (3) using a deep mine royalty rate, instead of a strip mine rate, for coal
removed by punch mining; (4) trespassing on a 30.1 acre tract not included in
the [l]ease; (5) failing to provide mine and operation maps, and (6) failing to
conduct mining operations in a workmanlike and legal manner."
1 9
It seems that the court in Shonk could have solely characterized the trial
court's award as unduly oppressive and thereby have avoided the issue of
whether forfeiture was justified because the lessor could be made whole by
monetary damages and non-renewal. In fact, the court went beyond its initial
holding by discussing waiver, estoppel and unconscionability. Yet the court
chose instead to begin the forfeiture section of its decision on the premise
that wholesale forfeiture was not justified because the lessor could be made
whole by monetary damages and non-renewal of the lease.13
The use of the monetary test in both Shonk and Ionno goes beyond the
general abhorrence of forfeiture and the result-oriented observance of
whether forfeiture will be unduly oppressive or unconscionable under the cir-
cumstances. The determination of whether monetary damages will be ade-
quate to compensate the lessor for breach of covenants is made ab initio,
before the remedy of forfeiture will even be considered. If damages are suffi-
cient to make the lessor whole, forfeiture will not be invoked.13
These courts have, in effect, taken away a substantial portion of the
lessor's and lessee's freedom to contract for a forfeiture provision within the
lease. Even when a forfeiture clause is added to a mining lease, the court may
initially ignore it until determination has first been made whether monetary
damages will be adequate compensation for the lessor. The decisions seem to
reflect that the sphere of freedom to contract for forfeiture provisions is
enveloped by the much larger concern of equity. The monetary damages test
is another tool used by the courts to achieve equitable results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a majority of jurisdictions, forfeiture may be obtained if (1) an express
forfeiture provision is provided in the coal mining lease, (2) the lessee has
breached a covenant or condition of the lease, (3) there has been no waiver or
estoppel by the lessor, 2' (4) there is no language within the lease specifically
negating the covenant which has been breached," and (5) the result of the
forfeiture is not unduly oppressive or unconscionable." In addition, the
129 Id.
' Id. at 142.
,31 Id.; 2 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
See supra notes 34-35.
3 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 17.
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language of the fofeiture clause will be strictly construed against the party
invoking the forfeiture. 3 '
A recent minority of jurisdictions, including West Virgina' 31 and Ohio,' 3
seem to have added a significant threshold inquiry to the above list. Before
any forfeiture of a coal mining lease can be obtained in these jurisdictions, a
determination must be made as to whether monetary damages are inade-
quate to compensate the lessor for the lessee's breach of a lease covenant. In
Ohio, an affirmative burden of proof is placed upon the lessor to prove that
monetary damages are inadequate before the court will consider forfeiture as
a remedy for a breached covenant.38 In West Virginia, the court will deter-
mine whether the lessor can be made whole by monetary damages,' 39 and no
burden of proof is placed upon the lessor. The Shonk court's act, however, of
invalidating the forfeiture clause contained within the lease may prompt the
further issue of whether the monetary determination will be made if a valid
forfeiture clause is included within the lease. If monetary damages are deter-
mined adequate to restore the lessor, forfeiture will neither be justified nor
enforced by the court.
Linda Rae Artimez
'" See supra note 40.
,.. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1982).
lonno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 2 Ohio St. 3d 131, 443 N.E.2d 504 (1983).
! 2 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
.. 288 S.E.2d at 142.
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